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Abstract: This paper investigates the activity of one of the most representative personality of the 
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1. Introduction 
NicolaeTitulescu’s diplomatic activity promoted him as a notable figure of the 
Romanian and international inter-war diplomacy whose complex sides are 
extensively reflected in the rich Romanian and foreign both contemporary and 
posthumous historiography (Agrigoroaiei, 1982, pp. 19-53; Dobrinescu, 1982, pp. 
349-362; Titulescu politico-diplomatic work: Correspondence / volume cared by 
George G. Potra, 2004; Potra (Ed), 2007). 
“A strong personality who used to enchant and amaze”, stated the historian Ioan 
Ciupercă, starting from the numerous records about “the strong impression left on 
his contemporaries from inside and outside the country “and from” the perpetuity 
of his thoughts and actions” (Ciupercă, 1982, p. 133). 
1.1. Objective and Hypotheses 
The value and the importance of his presence during 20 years in the Romanian 
political life, at the external political leadership of the state and in the big forum of 
the United Nations were the object of numerous analysis. 
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Titulescu’s removing on August 29th, 1936, from the position of Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Romania and the concerted action of the Romanian authorities 
of discriminating him and of stopping his every subsequent political movement, of 
diminishing his influence and his possibilities of actions confused the external 
political circles of the former allies, thus creating unease concerning the future 
orientation of Romania and abridging the Genevan forum of one of its most 
influential voices. 
Echoes of the reactions concerning this “ignoble” act was immediately heard by the 
Romanian political class, by his former external collaborators, by the internal and 
international public opinion and they were subsequently formulated as well, after 
the declaration of the war and its end, against which Titulecu had fought with all 
his energy. 
The publicist N.N. Petraşcu, insisting during a conference held in 1937 under the 
auspices of the International Studies Association, “Louis Barthou”, on the national 
value that Titulescu represents and which the country needed, also mentioned the 
message sent by the French minister Georges Mandel, who was “Clemenceau's 
right-hand man”, to the Romanian diplomat. He was writing to Titulescu no more 
no less, than “Your absence from Geneva is a danger for the peace” (Potra (Ed.) Ist 
part, 2007, p. 191).  
The paper of the Belgian Jacques de Launay, Titulescu et l’ Europe, published in 
1976, took an account of documents - and not just a few of them - which attested 
how much Titulescu’s withdrawal from the Minister of the Foreign Affairs of 
Romania was regretted in 1936. It is summarized here, in words that mean so 
much, the opinion formulated by Maxim Litvinov, immediately after the Second 
World War: “Had Titulescu stayed in his seat, nothing of what happened would not 
have taken place, the way we lived and suffered”. (de Launay, 1976 apud 
Agrigoroiei, 1982, p. 52). 
Antoine F. Frangulis (1888-1975), delegate of Greece at the Society of Nations, 
general secretary of the International Social Diplomatic Academy affirmed as well: 
“... [Titulescu] was a great jurist and had the vision of the future, just like 
Taleyrand. Had Europe taken into account the policy he was foreseeing, of course 
that its faith would have been a different one. He was perhaps, the greatest 
diplomat of this time.” (Buzatu, 1982, p. 86). 
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We are trying to outline, starting from these affirmations, hues and new meanings 
of Titulescu’s removing from the Romanian external political leadership that can 
contribute to sketching the importance of this Romanian diplomat’s figure. 
1.2. Context 
The end of the World War I, by obtaining the surrender of Germany and its allies, 
was opening a new difficult era, filled with efforts and confrontations, transferred 
from the battle field in the international political area, having as aim the obtaining 
of peace. The treaty system from Versailles has as a target the obtaining of a just 
peace, based on the nationalities’ principle and along with the Pact of the Society 
of Nations, will be at the base of the restructuring the international system of the 
times. 
Mechanisms that could avoid the starting on a new conflagration, similar to the 
ones that had just horrified the contemporaries, were thought and promoted by the 
political and cultural elites that embraced the idea that, basically, war is 
unappropriate with civilization and human nature. 
To struggle against it where it firstly appears, in the mind of humans, becomes the 
aim of the “education for peace” (Pita González, 2014), part of the cultural 
dimension of the activity promoted the Society of the Nations which wanted, 
foremost, a society of spirits. In that matter, Albert Einstein considered Society of 
Nations, the most important issue in the civilizations’ succession and Eduard 
Barnes, “the expression of the democratization of Europe and the world.” 
(Iacobescu, 1982, p. 159). 
The cultural dimension was doubling the most important nucleus of Society of 
Nations, the political one, that will create, based on the Pact, a complex system 
based on new principles of international right that will serve the proclaimed ideal. 
We insisted in one recent article on the paradigm of the inter-war idealism, 
outlining, on the same idea as Daniel Laqua, that it kept the liberal understanding 
of the previous century but from an international point of view, trying to overcome 
the specific anarchy of the international space by judicial regulations of the 
freedom of states’ actions (Laqua, 2011, pp. 246-247; Popa, 2014, pp. 137, 144). 
The contribution of the Romanian diplomat Nicolae Titulescu, who called himself 
one of the “accomplishing idealists/idealişti făptuitori” to the international law 
debates, collective security conferences and disarmament conferences would bring 
him international recognition proved with his election of 1926 as the vice-president 
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of the Diplomatic Academy of Paris, established at Gh. Marinescu’s proposal, but 
also as a permanent delegate of Romania and president of League of Nations’ 
Assembly, with two successive mandates, in 1930 and 1931 (Titulescu, 
Discursuri/Discourses, 1967, p. 319). 
It was outlined that after Tsarist Russia had left the Entente, the idea of 
democracies fighting against empires and subsequently the idea of democracies 
that were going to lead to democratizing international relations, the League of 
Nations was the expression of universalizing the parliamentary regime and 
apparently of the ultimate triumph of the right against force, of installing a judicial 
order to replace the violent solutions. 
Nicolae Titulescu’s activity involved this exact matter, democratizing international 
relations, and, accordingly to Rene Cassin, he wanted, just like Herriot, Aristide 
Briand or Louis Bathou, to incorporate nations in a system of safeness to keep 
them at shelter from the danger of the war. (Ciuperca, 1982, pp. 134-135). 
 
2. Analysis and Results  
2.1. Positions and Diplomatic Representation  
Born in March 16th, 1882, with a PhD degree in Law obtained in Paris, with 
brilliant results, a Civil Law professor at the University of Iasi and after that, at the 
University of Bucharest, N. Titulescu was beginning his diplomatic activity as a 
member of the National Assembly for the unity of Romanians founded in 1918, in 
Paris, and recognized by France in October 12, 1918. 
Managed by Take Ionescu V. Lucaci, O. Goga, C. Angelescu, Dr. I. Catacuzino, C. 
Diamandy, I. Ursu, Traian Vuia etc, this assembly in immigration was assuming to 
represent Romania in front of the Entente under the delicate circumstances in 
which Romania, left alone on the eastern field, following the Russian failure in 
October 1917, after a heroic defense, was getting a great part of its territory under 
the enemy’s occupation, as a consequence of the Buftea-Bucharest peace. 
The first delegate of Romania at the Peace Conference in Paris, N. Titulescu signs, 
alongside with Dr. I. Cantacuzino, on behalf of the Romanian government, first the 
pact of The League of Nations that will be included in all the peace treaties from 
the Versailles System and that will come into force in January 10, 1920. In June 4, 
1920 he also signed the Trianon Treaty, which internationally recognized the union 
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of Transilvania, Banat, Crisana and Maramures with the former Romanian 
Kingdom. 
Issues related to war reparations and the Austro-Hungarian heritage of Romania as 
a successor state will remain under his attention in the following years, as a 
delegate and Finance minister of the country in 1920-1921. 
His contribution as a minister in the improvement of the Romanian economy after 
the war and in solving the agrarian and financial problem will prepare him for a 
brilliant pleading of the Romanian cause in circumstances such as the process of 
the Hungarian optants or in different international conferences. 
His unique diplomatic qualities bring him as a reward the nomination at the end of 
1921 as a plenipotentiary minister and extraordinary envoy to London, position of 
a strategic importance, starting from the role that England will play alongside 
France in organizing the peace. Titulescu will illustrate it from December 1921 to 
June 1927 and from August 1928 to October 1932. 
His one and a half decay activity as a delegate of Romanian at the League of 
Nations, starting with the inaugural session from November 1920, has a great 
success exactly thanks to his loyalty to the ideal of maintaining the peace, helped 
by the principles of the pact, the good collaboration within the Romanian 
delegation, the mutual informing, the interest showed in an excellent representation 
of Romanian at Geneva, the extension of the contact with the delegates interested 
in maintaining of peace and of status quo, an exact informing of the public opinion. 
Mihai Iacobescu underlined that he, directly or indirectly, helped the Romanian 
state grow and improve its representational system to Geneva, from a simple and 
humble secretariat founded alongside the Romanian Legation in Berna, to its 
enlargement and transfer to Geneva in 1925, up to the absolute premiere, the 
creation, in 1927, on his initiative, of an diplomatic office with the status of 
Legation” (Iacobescu, 1982, p. 161). 
As a minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania between 1927-1928 and 1932-1936, 
he will work for the knowledge and support of the public opinion in the matter of 
the Society of Nations activity and the growth of its role, its democratization. The 
invested energy will give him the right to subsequently affirm: “I think I can speak 
of the League of Nations as of a part of my life” (Titulescu, 1967, p. 342). 
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2.2. Moment, Significance and Consequences of Removal  
On August 29th, 1936 Gheorghe Tătărescu sent Titulescu a telegram informing 
him of his demission and the government’s reshuffle, for reasons of 
„homogeneity”, by replacing him in foreign affairs with the old liberal Victor 
Antonescu. The discourteous manner of his removal affected his health so 
profoundly that he was close to passing away. The removal of N. Titulescu was the 
result of internal intrigues and extreme external pressure, with visible echoes and 
consequences on the country’s status and the efficiency and authority of the League 
of Nations. 
George Potra insists on the fact that over time Titulescu understood that “the King 
Carol II was the brain, while the Prime Minister Tătărescu just the hand of the 
political assassination committed on August 29th, 1936” (Potra, 2007, p. 78). It 
was confusing that the removal occurred after the king had refused to accept his 
resignation on July 11th, 1936, and after receiving full powers to negotiate the text 
of the mutual assistance pact with USSR. Thus he had managed to negotiate and 
obtain the signature of the foreign affairs commissary of the USSR on the project 
of the mutual assistance treaty between Romania and USSR, which essentially 
sanctioned the acknowledgement of the Nistru border and was to be officially 
signed in early September (Ciupercă, 1982, p. 155; Buzatu, 1982, p. 75; Potra, 
2007, p. 25 etc.). Also, Potra insisted in 1982 on the triggering elements of the 
crisis resulting in this removal. He concluded that the trigger may have been the 
Titulescu’s file put together by the German secret services, brought by Octavian 
Goga to the king, but mostly the imminence of signing the Romanian-Soviet 
mutual assistance treaty, when foreign pressure tended to pull the country onto 
another political direction the king considered more appropriate (Potra 1982, pp. 
277-293). The latter will soon impose his personal dictatorship.  
The British diplomat Anthony Eden highlighted in his telegram sent to the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry regarding his first meeting with Victor Antonescu that the 
justifications given to the Western allies for the “reasons for Titulescu’s removal, 
despite his multilateral personality”, were connected to the “tense relations 
between Mr. Titulescu and the Prime Minister (Gh. Tatarascu), due to the latter’s 
opinion that the government was not strong enough to deal with the anti-Semitic 
demonstrations, Mr. Titulescu’s prolonged absences from Romania, leading to 
losing touch with the public opinion here; his relations with Russia which, even if 
Mr Antonescu did not tell me, I believe that the Romanian government considered 
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too cordial; his disputes with the other politicians, like Mr Beck and Mr 
Stojadinović, who, in Romania’s opinion, made foreign policy difficult” (Potra, 
2015). 
A. Eden opined that “Mr Titulescu was, above all, a brilliant member of the 
Parliament of Geneva”, and wanted to evince that “when Germany was still 
unarmed and a relatively humble member of the League of Nations, and before 
Japan and then Italy could decide that force was the most convincing argument, 
Romania had much to gain, its Foreign Minister being a brilliant lawyer and orator 
in Geneva like Mr Titulescu was, and his explosive temper did not run any risks; 
but the times have changed and I think that now it is true, as Mr Antonescu said, 
during the meeting he granted me on September 3rd (my report no. 270) that Mr. 
Titulescu “pushed Romania into a position on the international field that he was no 
longer capable of maintaining” (Potra, 2015) Gradually, as it was noted, “the 
reasons of domestic policy are more and more at a loss as singular explanation, 
then also as principal explanation” and external factors are increasingly present in 
the explanations of the Romanian officials in the meetings with the foreign 
politicians, diplomats and journalists”.  
Eden’s opinion reflected, besides mentioning Titulescu’s name, a judgement of the 
new international context and at the same time the option to reposition Great 
Britain founded on a new type of political reasoning, ignoring the principles of the 
Pact of the Society of Nations. It was seen and clearly stated by the American 
ambassador in London, Breckrindge Long, who informed, as early as April 1935 
the State Department that the lack of an “actual opposition” to Germany would 
encourage it to prepare and implement “its expansionist program”, “legally”, and 
“in a time of peace”. But the governments of Europe were not willing to use force 
to stop it and anyway this alternative “would open the door to the extension of 
bolshevism […] As a last resort (Long said), the issue is to assess if it is not 
preferable to have German control over Central and South-Eastern Europe, rather 
than let communism infiltrate all over Europe” (N.A.U.S.A., R.G. 59, Breckrindge 
Long to Secretary of State, April 1, 1935, nr. 1022, 862.20/876, cf. Ciupercă, 1982, 
p. 152). In London, an agreement with Germany seemed necessary, and it would 
not support the Oriental Pact initiated by France.  
Titulescu’s efforts, in agreement with the Romanian interests in maintaining the 
status quo-and in fighting against revisionism according to League of Nations’ 
principles, for an indivisible peace grounded in collective security and regional 
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alliances of the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact, follow the Barthou line, of an 
Eastern Locarno. Concretized into two treaties, Franco-Soviet, and Franco-
Czechoslovakian, and a project of the Romanian-Soviet mutual assistance pact, 
whose signing failed by the very removal of Titulescu, the Barthou line also failed, 
making it possible for Germany to expand its influence in Central and South-
Eastern Europe. However, Hitler “monopolised anticommunism in his favour”, 
stating that “the only hope to save Germany and West-European civilization is to 
rearm Germany and prepare it in order to face the unavoidable Russian attack” 
(Ciupercă 1982, pp. 151, 153).  
Removing Titulescu was the very act that led to the failure of the Barthou line.  
The historian Ioan Ciupercă detailed the Memorandum of the Near East Division 
that, in response to the demand of the American State Secretary Cordell Hull (the 
future founder of UN) to send “a short comment on the reorganisation of the 
Tătărescu cabinet and the meaning of Titulescu’s removal”, also referred to the 
profile of the Romanian diplomat (Ciupercă, 1982, pp. 156-157). The 
characteristics that stood up were “passionate antirevisionist leader”, who said that 
“revision means war”, and to whom “article 19 in the Pact of the League of Nations 
does not exist”, “defender of small states”, diplomat for whom “the existence of the 
Little Entente and the Balkan Pact gives the member states the position of great 
power in European conferences”. Indeed, Titulescu had spoken of “a front of peace 
of 70 million people” at the ceremony when the Balkan Pact was signed, and had 
acted in favour of correlating the actions and interests of the two regional alliances, 
trying to create a unitary voice. The memorandum’s conclusion was that if 
Titulescu’s removal “means a step towards reorientation to Berlin, it also means a 
crucial moment in the post-war European situation. Romania’s reorientation in 
such a moment would mean the dissolution of the alliance between France and the 
Little Entente, and it would announce, perhaps, a constellation of Central Europe 
comprising Germany, Italy, the states of the Little Entente and Austria, Hungary 
and Bulgaria” (Ciupercă, 1982, pp. 156-157). The Romanian diplomat had fought 
to maintain the status quo, to organize peace on the basis of regional alliances and 
collective security, whose solidity was to be achieved by the closeness and 
agreements between France and England and USSR, before the latter turns to 
Germany, the leading power among the states promoting revisionism. He had 
considered that the Germany would turn towards USSR, but it should find us with 
an agreement already signed with the former, so that this reorganisation should not 
turn against us.  
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The new foreign affairs minister, the old liberal Victor Antonescu, was to take over 
a very elaborate diplomatic construct, whose elements had to be gradually adapted 
to the new line of foreign policy. However, the domestic opponents like Mihail 
Manoilescu blamed him for the lack of national character. The image is malicious: 
the new minister, running like a “foreman” to patch together “Mr Titulescu’s 
diplomatic edifice, that has all the qualities: it is built on the granite ground of the 
League of Nations and collective security: it is adorned with all the ornaments of 
talent and is lit from all sides by the most substantial publicity in all diplomatic 
history. Like art monuments, around which lights are on all night to evince all the 
beauty of their style, Mr Titulescu’s architectural work, rich in storeys of 
superposed pacts and pinnacles of paragraphs, lies under the blinding –and alas! 
expensive light of the lights of the international press!” (Manoilescu, 1937, 
February 25, in Potra, 2007, pp. 234-235). He insisted that “if it hadn’t been for the 
League of Nations, it would have had to be invented, so that to give Mr Titulescu a 
status and a country, like in his dreams”, “a place where he could speak publicly 
and profusely”, where to expose “his ego, this I for which there are not capitals 
enough […] for the whole world to see in a lit window, in the middle of a big 
international bazaar”. This is how this opponent understood why the “catastrophe 
of the League of Nations is a personal disaster to Mr Titulescu”. 
When talking about Titulescu’s contribution to promoting Romania’s foreign 
policy, Săvel Rădulescu, the closest collaborator of the great diplomat, considered 
that it may be assessed by the difference in status that our country had in 1918-
1920, departing from “the country with limited interests in the Peace conference”, 
when Titulescu started to represent Romania, and reaching “state acknowledged as 
equal partner in all treaties or documents with all countries, big or small” when he 
was removed in 1936 (Rădulescu, 1969. p. 363). 
Contemporaries like the French politician Edouard Herriot, referring to Titulescu’s 
contribution to promoting Romania’s international action between the two World 
Wars, noted that “this minister of a small country does great politics” (Tabouis, p. 
154). The confirmation of the increased power potential given to Romania by the 
brilliant diplomatic activity promoted by Titulescu also stems, according to the 
researcher Gh. Buzatu, from the words spoken by the Foreign Office upon hearing 
of the Romanian minister’s demission in 1936 : “Here is how Romania goes back 
into its geographical dimension” ( (Buzatu, 1982, p. 70).  
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2.3. Years of Exile – Cassandra’s Years… 
Throughout the period after dismissal until the end of his life (1936-1941) the great 
diplomat carefully followed the international developments and Romania's actions, 
hoping for a return to power. From Switzerland he returned to the country in 1937, 
but the Iron Guard threats and hostility and the concerted action of his political 
opponents made him to retire to France. 
During the meeting in Saint-Moritz on the 8th of January 1937, he was confessing 
to the Yugoslav leader Milan Stojadinović that in September 1936 he had been 
almost dead, he had felt lost and suffered as he could no longer fight for his 
country. He was preaching loyalty for The Little Entente and the system of 
collective security and was emphasizing with an amazing intuition of the 
developments that “Today I am afraid of war (...) The only issue I am interested in, 
the only one for which I would give my life, is that of maintaining our current 
borders” (Potra, 2007, p. 138). 
Aware of his own value, he had stated in 1937, when he was in Bucharest, 
according to the reporter N. Carandino: “They are criminals. They do not realize it. 
You be the judge of that! Does the country have enough money to manufacture a 
new Titulescu? This is not an issue of personal value. I can admit that they have 
found another similar one, if not better. But to make him known, to advertise him 
in the press, to get him connected, to create him a pedestal, you need many years 
and many millions. But what do they know? They believe that Europe works like 
Bucharest” (Potra (Ed/), 2007, I, p. 79). On some other occasion he said that “the 
evil that these men are doing will not possibly be repaired even by me”! 
In April 4th, 1937, Victor de Lacroix, the French Minister in Prague, was 
informing the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yvon Delbos, about the German-
Czechoslovakian relations and the Little Entente state. He mentioned the bad 
impression made by Minister V. Antonescu through his “helpless pessimism”, “the 
passive  of obstacles and exaggeration of dangers” and wished to add that “I dare 
hope that a man of Mr. Titulescu’s value and dynamism will immediately take in 
his hands the Romanian foreign policy” (Potra (Ed.), 2007, p. 248). 
Moreover, in January 1937, in the context of some Anglo-French differences and 
complaints requiring a change to be “at least formal – at the level of the League of 
Nations’ leaders (Assembly and Council, Secretariat, commissions, etc.)”, the 
name of Nicolae Titulescu was mentioned in connection with replacing Joseph 
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Avenol as a general secretary of the League of Nations in order to “reactivate and 
return to the orientation and the major objective of maintaining peace” (Potra (Ed.), 
2007, p. 9). 
Titulescu continued to actively express himself, even if from the position of a 
former minister, about the international developments and to suggest solutions to 
the ones involved. 
The difference in prominence between the new foreign affairs minister, V. 
Antonescu, and Titulescu was obvious.  
The foreign policy line/ orientation promoted by the former minister is confirmed 
in the Parliament by his very successor, which was even more confusing to the 
members of parliament regarding the reasons leading to Titulescu’s removal.. The 
analysis of these parliamentary debates give a glimpse of the future foreign 
direction of Romania, that of “adapting” to the new developments and 
manifestations of conciliarism. Titulescu had assessed as early as July 4, 1924 that 
“the revenge war started […] under the form of judicial duels in Geneva”, and on 
August 7, as a Romanian minister in London, he stated in a declaration to The 
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that “the Western powers give me the 
impression of sleepwalkers who are unconsciously setting fire to their own house” 
(Buzatu, 1982, p. 85). His anticipatory ability makes him foresee “peace 
organization” as the only reasonable solution, devoting all his efforts to organizing 
this “front”, in whose “trenches” he will be found together with brilliant minds 
devoted to the pacifist ideal promoted by the League of Nations. It was not a 
coincidence that Titulescu was on the list, after the 1933 assassination of I. G. 
Duca, together with Roland Koester, the German ambassador in Paris, five or six 
personalities, Louis Barthou, king Alexander of Yugoslavia, the Austrian 
chancellor Dollfus, king Albert of Belgium, who, if removed, “Germany would 
save itself a war, and then obtain whatever it wants from Europe!” (Tabouis, G., p. 
156, apud Ciuperca, 1982, p. 149).  
Indeed, despite assurances after Titulescu's dismissal, change of direction of the 
Romanian foreign policy becomes evident and it will be sanctioned by the allies. 
Mihail S. Ostrovsky, the Soviet envoy in Bucharest reproached in March 1937, to 
the successor Titulescu, on developments in relations with Poland that “the concept 
of collective security passes to the concept of so-called neutrality” and even “anti-
Soviet actions “. 
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The conclusion of the dialogue was that, in the absence of Titulescu, the attempt to 
strengthen the relations is made so that, without acquiring anything new, 
“Bucharest loses what it has”, that “Romania's borders are more vulnerable now 
than ever: those we ran after and for acquiring their friendship we removed 
Titulescu, respond us with kicks in the back (Italy), others are inclined to consider 
us a semicolony, in order to supply them with raw materials and where everything 
is allowed.” Filipescu accepted in front of Ostrovskzy that “the country would not 
have been in this situation if he (Titulescu) had still held the position. Au moins, il 
aurait pu garder le prestige du pays et la dignité nationale» (Potra, 2007, p. 229). 
Also Maxim Litvinov told Edmond Ciuntu, Romania’s extraordinary delegate and 
minister plenipotentiary in Moscow, that “he sees Romania irremediably going 
down to the slope of fascism” (Potra, 2007, p. 225). 
Critical conclusions were coming from the inside and, perhaps the most illustrative 
is the one made by N.N. Pătrascu during the conference from “Louis Barthou” 
Association of International Studies from February 11th, 1937: “We are now 
suspected by France, with relaxed connections in both bodies of the Little Entente 
and the Balkan Entente, badly seen by Russia, with no real progress in Germany or 
Italy. We ruined what we had without adding anything in return. This is the 
alarming conclusion of the 6 missing months of Mr. Titulescu from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs” (Potra, 2007, p. 193). 
The circumstances of the removal created a situation in which the newly appointed 
minister could not benefit, at the beginning of his term, according to the habitual 
protocol, from his predecessor’s support and information on the main ongoing 
issues and their stage, which would prove tremendously detrimental to Romania’s 
interests. The efforts that Titulescu had made for so many years to obtain the 
acknowledgement by USSR of the common Nistru borders, which had prompted 
him to obtain Litvinov’s signature on the paragraph containing this provision in the 
text of the bilateral agreement to be officially signed in early September 1936, 
would be annulled by the request from the new Romanian minister addressed to 
USSR to acknowledge de jure Bessarabia as part of Romania.  
Titulescu was personally informed by Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet commissary in 
charge of the Foreign Affairs, at the meeting in May 1937, of this diplomatic 
blunder which rendered void the Non-aggression Convention signed in 1933, the 
project of the Romanian-Soviet mutual assistance pact signed by Litvinov on July 
21, 1936 and ignored Ionel Bratianu’s instructions of 1924 regarding Bessarabia. 
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The Russian diplomat mentioned that he had found out also about Victor 
Antonescu’s statement in the Parliament according to which “we have no mutual 
assistance pact with Soviet Russia, nor do we have the intent to have such a pact”. 
The meeting in Talloires seems to have been requested by the Russian diplomat 
“not to risk being disloyal” to the negotiations with Titulescu. Starting from the 
obvious fact that Romania had changed its foreign policy, Litvinov showed the 
need to stand up “against the documents that Titulescu made us sign”, underlining 
that he wanted “the potential represented by Bessarabia to become Russian, not 
German”, which was why he communicated that the USSR would try to take over 
Bessarabia “by any legal and military means possible” (Potra (Ed.), 2007, p. 25). 
Titulescu will later refer to this meeting and his efforts to convince Litvinov to 
abide by the documents he had signed, in his work The Foreign Policy of Romania 
(1937), and also in his Memorandum-letter to King Carol II, on March 9th, 1940, 
after the unsuccessful attempts to see the king in 1937 when he was in the country. 
In the Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is also one of 
Titulescu’s Memorandum addressed to King Carol II on Romania’s position in 
international relations and at a future peace conference on September 11th, 1939, 
as well as a Memorandum of October 1940 (Dobrinescu & Buzatu, 1982, p. 350) 
The isolation that Titulescu was thrown into made it possible for the new Foreign 
Affairs Minister to find out as late as April 21, 1937 about the text of Titulescu’s 
telegram to Germany regarding the availability to sign mutual assistance pacts with 
both USSR and Germany. It has been sent by the Romanian ambassador in Berlin, 
Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, and stated that “the guiding line of Romanian foreign 
policy [..] of equal friendship with all the Great Powers, from which we do not 
understand Germany to be excluded” (Potra (Ed), 2007, pp. 272-273; also p. 262). 
The hostility of King Charles II, who had categorically refused to sign the decree 
of renewal of the mandate as a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 
Hague which had expired in November 27th, 1936, would make room to a 
concerted action of isolation, by its denigrating in front of the international 
partners, the exclusion of collaborators and supporters etc. from the diplomatic 
corps. However, as it was highlighted by Adrian Năstase, he himself a former 
foreign minister of Romania and President of Titulescu European Foundation, “the 
variety, multiplicity and altitude of Nicolae Titulescu’s contacts (..), hard to 
understand even for a minister in office, are more appreciated, at its best, for the 
one who was just a “former” minister, ultimately for an illustrious individual” 
(Nastase, Foreword, Potra (Ed), 2007, p. 3). 
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Editing Romania's Foreign Policy that was to come out in French, English and 
Romanian, his Diary and the many documents later purchased by Hoover 
Institution Archives, as well as the numerous conferences held at the invitation of 
various organizations and institutions, although they were not completed by the 
publication of his memoirs, more clearly outlines his vision about the international 
political life of the ways and means by which peace could be saved (Buzatu, 1982, 
p. 75) 
Promoting the interests of the unitary Romanian state, maintaining the peace and 
status quo were the main objectives of N. Titulescu. His contemporaries remarked 
his ability to analyze international realities, and also to sense the direction of future 
developments, which helped him direct the foreign policy of Romania and serve 
the pacifist ideal of Society of Nations. 
Starting from the situation as “a soldier in the trenches of peace”, concerned with 
outlining a strategy for peace, stating that peace is indivisible and showing that 
border controlling means war, he spoke of “spiritualization of borders”, helped at 
defining the aggressor and urged to “order in thinking” and action. Traditional 
alliances with France and England, integration of USSR in the SN system logic, 
supporting and strengthening the SN action, collective security through regional 
alliances of small and middle antirevisionist states, the Little Entente and the 
Balkan Entente, were connected to his strategy of rescuing peace, which he served 
in his diplomatic activity and the efforts after his dismissal. 
In his own words, the tragic of his condition is assimilated to that of ancient 
Cassandra, a character whose role he said he was tired of playing, in the summer of 
1939 when he authorized Charles Henry to communicate the French authorities to 
immediately sign the Franco-Soviet and British pact as the last chance of the 
European peace (Buzatu 1982, p. 86). The war breakout on September 1st, 1939 
after signing the Ribbentropp - Molotov Pact and the Romanian territorial losses 
during the year 1940 that he witnessed were circumstances that deepened the 
suffering of the same role and brought his end in March 17th, 1941. 
As stated by the researcher V. Sîrbu upon investigating the archives of the Nobel 
Institute “Although an entire mythology surrounds Titulescu and his alleged 
recommendations for the Nobel Peace Prize, he was in fact never nominated” 
(Sirbu, 2011, pp. 279-81). The address from February 7th, 1935 to the Rector of 
the Council of the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy in Iasi, contained the proposal 
of Titulescu’s nomination for the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1935 (Buzatu, 1982, p. 
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488). However, the official proposal was apparently not submitted to the deciding 
forums. 
Titulescu himself recommended for the Nobel Prize, on January 28, 1935, the 
former Prime Minister of Brazil, Afrânio de Mello Franco. 
His brilliance, devoted to peace, with a fabulous memory, a good knowledge of the 
principles of international law and an intuition of the evolution direction, a 
remarkable oratorical talent, Titulescu was one of the most brilliant diplomats of 
his time, whose removal accelerated the way towards war. George Anastasiu, the 
youngest Titulescu’s close collaborator argued in the interview from 6th of July, 
1981 to the “Radio Free Europe” even that this diplomate, kept as the Romanian 
foreign minister, could be able by his authority, by his prestige by his capacity to 
find solutions and original, prodigious formulas, “to change the course that the 
events were subsequently committed to” (Potra (Ed.), 2007, part III, p. 9). 
 
3. Conclusions 
Titulescu's dismissal was the act by which Barthou line failed and Society of 
Nations lost one of its most influential voices. 
The principles and solutions promoted by him referring to the new type of 
sovereignty of states burdened by the obligation to observe the international law, 
the democratization of international relations, removing war outside the law, the 
collective security, the role of diplomacy in maintaining peace and the need for an 
active and efficient international forum to serve them, maintain their topicality. 
Although the value of his action in the service of peace is obvious, he was not 
nominated for the Nobel Prize for Peace. 
We agree with the historian Ioan Ciuperca that N. Titulescu may have understood 
SN weaknesses and that the greatness of his action resulted from assuming the 
mission of peace preserving under the given circumstances and with such imperfect 
means. 
“Pilgrim” and “strategist of peace”, opponent of revanchist circles, although he 
enjoyed international recognition in the context of lack of support from domestic 
policymakers and revanchist warlike circles progresses, he was able to play only 
“Cassandra’s role”.  
RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
 179 
4. References 
Agrigoroaiei, I., Buzatu, Gh. & Pavelescu I. (1982). Major directions in Nicolae Titulescu's 
diplomatic activity - from a historiographic point of view, in G. Buzatu, Titulescu and the peace 
strategy (pp. 19-55). Iasi: Junimea. 
Bacon, Walter-Meredith Jr. (1999). Nicolae Titulescu. Iasi: “European Institute” Publishing House. 
Iacobescu, Mihai (1988). Romania and the Society of Nations 1919-1929. Bucharest: Academy of the 
Socialist Republic of Romania. 
Ciupercă, I. (1982). Nicolae Titulescu and the role the Small Powers play in contemporary 
international life. In G. Buzatu, Titulescu and the peace strategy. Iasi: Junimea. 
Dobrinescu, V. & Buzatu, Gh. (1982). N. Titulescu and the Peace Strategy: A Bibliography. 
*** (1982). Titulescu and the Strategy of Peace. Coordinator Gh. Buzatu. Iasi: Ed. Junimea. 
Fundaţia Europeană Titulescu (FET), (2004). Titulescu, N. Opera politico-diplomatică: 
Corespondență/Titulescu, N. Political and Diplomatic Opera: Correspondence Coordinator George 
G. Potra. Bucharest: FET. 
Oprea, Ion.M. (1966). Nicolae Titulescu. Bucharest: Ed. S. 
Pita González, Alexandra. (2014). Educar para la paz. Mexico y la Cooperacion Intelectual 
Internacional, 1022-1948/Educate for peace. Mexico and the International Intellectual Cooperation, 
1922-1948. México: Secretary of Foreign Affairs, University of Colima Publishing House. 
Popa, Anişoara. (2014). Cultural Dimension of International Relations during Interwar Period: 
International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation and the scientific study of international relations. 
Acta Universitatis Danubius. Relationes Internationales, Vol. 7, No 2 (2014), http://journals.univ-
danubius.ro/index.php/internationalis/article/view/2688/2370. 
Potra, G. Studiu introductiv la FET, (2007). N. Titulescu, Opera politico-diplomatică (1 ianuarie–31 
decembrie 1937) (partea I / N. Titulescu, Political-diplomatic Work (1 January-31 December 1937) 
part I, II and III, Coordinator George G. Potra, Bucharest: FET. 
Potra, G. (2015). The Removal of Nicolae Titulescu seen by the Foreign Office (4). Revista Art-emis 
Academy, 4 January, 2015, [online at] http://www.art-emis.ro/istorie/2665-demiterea-lui-nicolae-
titulescu-vazuta-de-foreign-office-4.html.  
Rădulescu, Săvel (1969). Nicolae Titulescu 1882-1941. Diplomati ilustri/Illustrious diplomats, vol. I, 
Bucharest: Ed. Politica. 
Sirbu, V. (2011). The Nobel Peace Prize from a Romanian perspective– The Interwar Period. 
Romanian Review for Baltic and Nordic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 275-298. 
Tabouis, G (1958). 20 years of diplomatic tensions. Paris. 
*** (1982). Titulescu and the Strategy of Peace. Coordinator Gh. Buzatu, Iaşi: Ed. Junimea. 
*** (1967). Nicolae Titulescu Discursuri/Nicolae Titulescu Speeches. Bucharest: Editura Ştiintifică.  
